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Agreement and the opening of
Mexican markets to trade, it
contributed to the rapid recu-
peration of the Mexican econ-
omy after 1994–95. And it was
essential in limiting the 2001
Mexican downturn to a mild re-
cession, a landmark in a coun-
try where every downturn of
the prior 30 years had been ac-
companied by a financial crisis.
Macro stability has also
brought into focus the growing
synchronization of the U.S. and
Mexican economies, primarily
the product of strengthening
trade ties between the two
countries. The 2001 recession
was led by manufacturing in
both the United States and
Mexico, and slower recovery in
Mexico was largely because of
Mexico’s greater dependence
on industrial production.
In 2004, however, Mexico
finally caught up with the
United States, as both countries
saw GDP grow at a 4.4 percent
annual rate. It was the best
year for both countries in this
round of expansion. This arti-
cle examines Mexico’s eco-
nomic performance in 2004 and
discusses its economic and pol-
itical outlook.
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decade after the Tequila
Crisis of December 1994, the
Mexican economy presents a
macroeconomic landscape 
that has been fundamentally
improved. An independent cen-
tral bank brings new transpar-
ency and accountability to the
conduct of monetary policy,
with a stated objective of tar-
geting inflation. The fiscal de-
ficit has been held under 2 per-
cent of gross domestic product
(GDP) every year since the
1994–95 crisis. The exchange
rate floats successfully, with
accumulated foreign exchange
reserves reaching nearly $65
billion in December. Markets
for government debt attract
investors at low rates, and gov-
ernment securities now have a
duration of up to 20 years.
The success of Mexican
macroeconomic policy can be
seen in the course of recent
history. Together with the
North American Free Trade
A  
                       Mexico Takes Off
Economic activity in Mexico
intensified in the summer of
2003. Figure 1 shows two
economy-wide measures of
Mexican economic activity: a
coincident economic indicator
produced by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Dallas and an
index of global economic activ-
ity produced by Mexico’s chief
statistical agency. The two indi-
cators point to growth in 2004
of 5.6 and 5.2 percent, respec-
tively, while the expansion in
GDP was 4.4 percent.
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The most strongly growing
sectors last year were industrial
activity; transportation, ware-
housing and communications;
wholesale and retail trade; and
financial services. Within the
industrial sector, growth was
strongest in construction, man-
ufacturing, and electric, gas,
and water utilities. Together
these sectors accounted for
nearly 80 percent of Mexico’s
overall growth in 2004.
Consumption and Investment
There are numerous paral-
lels between recent economic
events in the United States and
Mexico, including a downturn
in domestic investment as a




















2004; in the third quarter, it
reached its best quarterly per-
formance since 2000, at an 8.5
percent annual rate.
Because the 2001 recession
was not driven by financial
crises, a stable peso and low
rates of inflation allowed do-
mestic consumption to support
the Mexican economy during
the downturn. In 2004, private
consumption averaged 8.4 per-
cent annual growth through the
first three quarters, with dur-
ables, nondurables and services
all sharing in these increases.
As job growth improves in 2005,
growing employment and




30-year low of 4
percent in 2003,
but rebounded in







to a weaker peso.




tary policy nine times in 2004,
pushing short-term interest
rates from 6 percent to 9 per-
cent in an effort to maintain
inflation within the targeted




$385.8 billion in 2004, up from
$335.3 billion a year earlier.
Mexico’s No. 1 trading partner
continues to be the United
States by far, representing 72
percent of total trade. Asia fol-
lows with 13 percent and
Europe with 8 percent. U.S.–
Mexico trade seems to be back
on track, rising at annual rates
of 13.5 percent since January
2004.
Trade has been supported
by sustained increases in the
real exchange rate, a roughly
25 percent devaluation since
March 2002. The peso was
among the few currencies in
the world to depreciate against
the dollar in 2004, as the dollar
fell by 5.4 percent in 2004
against a broadly weighted
index of foreign currencies.
2
The maquiladora industry
was the largest generator of
foreign exchange for Mexico,
earning $19.1 billion. This was
followed by remittances from
2
Figure 1
Mexican Economy Growing Since Summer 2003
Index, January 2000 = 100
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática; 
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Dallas Fed coincident index
INEGI Global Economic Activity Index
Figure 2
Consumption Fueled the Economy
Real Index, 2000:Q1 = 100*
* Seasonally adjusted.
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concentrated in the Federal
District (22.2 percent), Nuevo
León (9.4) and Tabasco (6.1).
The states of Campeche, Jalisco,
Veracruz, Baja California, Ta-
maulipas, Sonora, México and
Chihuahua were all in the 3 to
4 percent range. Together these
states accounted for well over




Much of the credit for jump-
starting the Mexican economy











91 percent of Mexi-
can exports go to
the United States,





imports are from the United
States, and 91 percent of Mex-
ico’s imports are industrial
goods. The maquiladora plays
a big role in these numbers;
goods to be assembled are
exported by the United States,
and assembled final products
return to the United States as
domestic imports.
4
The revival of U.S. manufac-
turing began in the summer of
2003, attributable to a resump-
tion of U.S. investment and
strong export growth that
accompanied global expansion
and a weaker dollar. Mexican
manufacturing responded on
virtually the same schedule
(Figure 4).
Like the U.S. decline in
manufacturing, the industrial
recession was long and deep in
Mexico. The decline began in
late 2000. Mexican manufactur-
ing employment fell by more
than 500,000, or 12 percent, in
2001. Losses continued with a
2.1 percent decline in 2002
before stabilizing in 2003. The
turnaround in jobs began last
year, adding back more than
60,000 Mexican factory jobs.
The good news from Mexi-
can manufacturing is that for
the 2001–04 period, labor pro-
ductivity grew at a 4.2 percent
annual rate (Figure 5). Real
Mexicans working abroad at
$16.6 billion, oil at $15.6 billion
and tourism at $5 billion. Ma-
quiladora earnings passed oil
in 1998 to become No. 1, and
2004 marked the first year re-
mittances passed oil to assume
the No. 2 position.
3 Mexico’s
international reserves stood at
historic highs near $65 billion
at the end of 2004.
Sectoral Gains
As consumption, investment
and trade improved in 2004,




Retail trade increased by 
7 percent in 2004, and whole-
sale trade increased by 5 per-
cent. Retail gains were wide-
spread, shared by auto dealers,
furniture and home appliance
stores, clothing and shoe
stores, and department stores.
In wholesale trade, the strong-
est sectors were oil and energy,
construction materials, metallic
manufacturing materials and
general inputs to manufactur-
ing (Figure 3).
Mexico’s construction sector
grew 12.5 percent during 2004,
continuing an upward trend
that began in July 2003. Gen-
3
Figure 3
Retail and Wholesale Trade Improve
Index, January 2000 = 100*
* Seasonally adjusted.
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Figure 4
Manufacturing Sector Rebounds
Index, January 2000 = 100*
*Seasonally adjusted.
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática;
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                  wages matched a decade-long
trend by increasing at a 2.4
percent annual rate.
The maquiladora industry is
a vital component of Mexico’s
industrial sector, big enough to
have its own implications for
the Mexican economy. It gener-
ates half of Mexico’s exports,
accounts for $19 billion in for-
eign exchange and provides 
30 percent of Mexico’s manu-
facturing employment. As with
the rest of Mexican manufactur-
ing, the 2001 recession was dif-
ficult for the maquiladoras.
From the industry peak in Oc-
tober 2000 to the trough in July
2003, the industry lost 290,000
jobs, a 21 percent decline. Re-
cent research points to the U.S.
business cycle as the chief cul-
prit in this downturn, although
many low-wage jobs in sectors
like apparel, toys and leather
are unlikely to return.
5
Maquiladora payroll employ-
ment has been increasing since
late last summer, again match-
ing closely trends in the U.S.
industrial sector. During 2004,
maquiladoras added back
75,000 jobs, or 26 percent of
those lost to the downturn.
Among the sectors leading this

























picture has improved greatly
over the past decade, there is
ample room for continued
gains from reform. According
to most estimates, Mexico’s
current 4 percent growth is
bumping against the ceiling of
its potential growth rate. To
grow faster—to improve the
potential growth rate to 6 per-
cent or higher—changes are
needed in Mexico’s basic insti-
tutional fabric. More specifi-
cally, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and
Development recently pub-
lished a list of what it regards
as the main challenges for
Mexico to reach 6 percent
growth:
• Remain committed to
macroeconomic stability.
• Put public revenue and
expenditure on a more
solid and predictable
footing.
• Ensure that resources for
education and training
are used more effectively.
• Raise and improve the
stock of infrastructure
capital.
• Pursue labor market
reforms.
• Ease regulatory measures
and other impediments,
including failings of the
judicial system and high
perceived levels of cor-
ruption.
7
The past year brought little
or no progress in advancing a
series of widely proposed
structural reforms to the Mexi-
can economy. The need for the
reforms is recognized, but the
political will is lacking. Tax re-
form is high on virtually every
agenda because Mexico’s tax
system in 2002 yielded reve-
nues equal to only 18.8 percent
of GDP, compared with 26.9
percent in the United States
and 34.2 percent in Canada.
Further, oil continues to deliver
close to one-third of public
sector revenue, an unreliable
source given the volatility of oil
prices. The additional revenues
must be committed to basic
infrastructure and education.
Energy reform is needed to
bring down high electricity
prices and infuse much-needed
capital into oil and natural gas
exploration and production.
Mexico’s labor market ranks
among the world’s most rigid,
imposing high nonwage costs
on employers. And Mexico
ranks low on most measures of
governmental effectiveness, re-
gulatory quality, rule of law
and control of corruption.
Not only are reforms
needed, but also the timing of
such reforms is crucial for Mex-
ico’s future economic growth.
8
The Fox administration has
been unable to move reforms
forward without a majority in
Congress. Figure 6 shows the
division of votes among Mex-
ico’s three major parties in re-
cent years. Last year was the
final opportunity to move re-




Index, January 2000 = 100* Thousands*
* Seasonally adjusted.




















       presidential election in 2006
because political parties have
now turned their focus inward
to select candidates. 
The 2003 midterm elections
may point to the return of the
Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) after a six-year break in its
70 years of rule. Or the Party
of the Democratic Revolution
(PRD) could ride the popularity
of Mexico City’s mayor into the
Mexican White House, becom-
ing the first socialist party to
rule the country. Or perhaps
the National Action Party (PAN),
which now rules the country,
can score another victory.
Given the current division of
voting sentiment among the
public, it is a battle that prom-
ises to leave deep political
scars.
It is virtually certain Mexico
will operate without significant
fiscal, labor or energy reforms
through 2006. The opportunity
to pass such reforms in the
next administration will depend
on the 2006 electoral outcome,
as well as on the intensity of




are predicting only slightly
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deficit as a risk
to U.S. expansion, and in turn
to Mexico. Also, an unantici-
pated acceleration of inflation
could put both countries’
economies at risk. Growing
political uncertainty as the 2006
election approaches could also
begin to slow growth, if con-
sumers, businesses or foreign
investors hold back on spend-





Cañas and Coronado are assis-
tant economists and Gilmer is a
vice president at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 For more information behind the
methodology of the Mexican index of
coincident economic indicators, see
“Business Cycle Coordination Along
the Texas–Mexico Border,” by Keith R.
Phillips and Jesus Cañas, Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working Paper
no. 0502, July 2004, available at
www.dallasfed.org.
2 According to the Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta trade-weighted dollar index,
available at www.frbatlanta.org/
econ_rd/dol_index/di_index.cfm.
3 For more information on remittances,
see “Workers’ Remittances to Mexico,”
by Roberto Coronado, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, El Paso Branch
5
Figure 6
Mexican Electoral Results, 1991–2003
Percent of total votes
* Includes alliance with Green Ecological Party of Mexico.






















                  ll indicators point to
continued strength in the Hous-
ton economy. The Houston
Purchasing Managers Index re-
mained over 60 for the 12th con-
secutive month, with sales, pro-
duction and employment all
registering nice gains. A value
over 50 indicates expansion in
the local economy. Labor mar-
kets continue to strengthen, with
12-month growth in employment
now at 1.7 percent, and the un-
employment rate fell from 6.1
percent to 5.5 percent during
the same period. 
Retail Sales and Autos
Retail sales are mixed in
Houston. At opposite ends of
the spectrum, discount and up-
scale stores reported solid re-
sults in January and February,
while department stores barely
met plan. Furniture stores and
small independent retailers were
operating below expectations.
Overall sales are probably up
marginally. 
New car and truck sales in
Houston started the year out
right, with January sales up
7 percent over January 2004. 
It was the second consecutive
month of 12-month increases—
the first time this has happened
since late 2001. 
Real Estate
Existing home sales contin-
ued to set records in January,
with new highs for the month
for properties sold, value of
transactions and median sales
price. Sales are expected to
slow in 2005 due to higher in-
terest rates and a growing over-
supply of apartments. More
jobs and expanding income
should keep the market healthy,
A however, and shift the focus
from starter homes to more up-
scale properties. 
Absorption and occupancy
are growing again for Houston
office space, although rents are
still falling. The central business
district and Galleria are leading
the improvement. Retail absorp-
tion is healthy, with rents and
occupancy flat. Industrial occu-
pancy rose during the past year,
but flattened out in the fourth
quarter.
Oil Services and Machinery
The domestic rig count
moved up by more than 20 rigs
in recent weeks, with much of
the improvement in Texas. Oil
service respondents were not
bashful about using the “boom”
word, comparing current condi-
tions to 1978. They were quick
to add, however, that they were
anxious to avoid the hangover
experienced at that last party. 
Capacity is becoming an
issue. Some customers are con-
tracting upfront for rigs and ser-
vices for multiple jobs to ensure
availability. People are the main
constraint, however, because of
shortages of drilling crews and
workers with key skills. Prices
and margins are such that serv-
ice companies are now sharing
fully in the high commodity
prices producers have enjoyed
for some time. 
Refining
Refiners have begun their
spring turnarounds. A refinery
HoustonBeigeBook February 2005
fire and a series of operating
problems have kept Gulf Coast
refineries at capacity utilization
near 90 percent. Refiner margins
have moderated from high lev-
els in recent weeks because
product prices have not kept
up with rising crude price. In-
ventories of heating oil im-
proved counterseasonally, and
gasoline inventories were in
excellent shape for February. 
Chemicals
Virtually every segment of
the petrochemical industry is
doing extremely well based on
revenue, pricing and profits.
Strong product demand is the
chief factor giving strength to
the industry. Several years of
poor demand resulted in re-
duced capacity for a number of
products, and current strong de-
mand is outstripping remaining
capacity. 
Chlor-alkali, olefins, plastics
and aromatics are all projecting
record profits in 2005. Among
the aromatics, benzene is ex-
pected to see a return to record
prices in coming weeks as the
turnaround season continues
for refineries. Propylene prices
are up due to strong demand,
with some signs of prebuying
by customers to avoid future
price hikes. Polyethylene prices
fell back by 2 cents per pound
as feedstock prices slipped,
and demand eased, especially
export-related demand. 
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